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How compensation policy based on EVA performance reduces the conflict between managers and shareholders

dc.contributor.authorRibeiro, Humberto
dc.contributor.authorFonseca, Cristina
dc.date.accessioned2013-04-02T14:21:10Z
dc.date.available2013-04-02T14:21:10Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.description.abstractThere is a well-known conflict between managers and shareholders, superbly illustrated by the agency theory. A way for shareholders to ensure that managers will perform optimally, by taking the best actions and decisions, is to tie managers’ compensation to the performance of the firms. However, how can we fairly measure their performance? The Economic Value Added (EVA) methodology seems to be a good solution; recent events reinforced the idea that accounting indicators analysis may not be a suitable approach. The EVA is not a widespread concept in Portugal and its inception is relatively recent. To have an idea about how Portuguese managers perceive EVA and to understand which strategies (e.g. wages policy, bonuses, stocks and/or stocks options) firms utilize to make everybody happy, particularly managers, we developed a study with Portuguese public entities, using the questionnaire methodology.por
dc.description.sponsorshipLondon Metropolitan Universitypor
dc.identifier.citationRibeiro, Humberto; Fonseca, Cristina (2005). How compensation policy based on EVA performance reduces the conflict between managers and shareholders. In 4th International Conference on CSR. Londonpor
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10198/8310
dc.language.isoengpor
dc.subjectEVApor
dc.subjectCompensation policypor
dc.titleHow compensation policy based on EVA performance reduces the conflict between managers and shareholderspor
dc.typeconference object
dspace.entity.typePublication
oaire.citation.conferencePlaceLondon, United Kingdompor
oaire.citation.title4th International Conference on CSRpor
rcaap.rightsopenAccesspor
rcaap.typeconferenceObjectpor

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